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 1 
 
Neil Duxbury
 
    ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION AND  
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
† 
 
 
Various seventeenth-century parliamentarians resorted to the concept of acquisitive prescription 
when denouncing irresponsible use of the royal prerogative. Often, the concept was invoked to 
convey nothing more than that a custom had existed since time immemorial. But sometimes 
the concept was being used in its legal sense: to denote the acquisition of a right (as if someone 
with the authority to grant that right had done so) by virtue of some instance of long and 
uninterrupted enjoyment over a period of time. This paper considers the application of 
acquisitive prescription, a doctrine rooted in the medieval law of land obligations, in Stuart 
constitutional discourse.  
 
Keywords: fundamental rights, prescription, custom, constitutional history, royal prerogative, 
Magna Carta 
 
I  Introduction 
 
Describing rights as “fundamental” makes sense when they are protected in a written 
constitution. But absent such a constitution, what could a fundamental right be? If 
citizens are governed by a legal system under which ultimate law-making authority is 
accorded to the legislature, so that there are no rights constitutionally protected against 
legislative disturbance, is it not simply a mistake to say that, within that system, there are 
fundamental rights? British parliamentary sovereignty avoids this conclusion. The 
presumption behind the British system of sovereignty is not only that parliament has 
unlimited law-making authority but also that parliament will exercise its authority 
responsibly, which means, among other things, legislators treating certain rights as ones 
not to be disturbed unless there are very strong reasons – typically, public interest 
considerations – justifying disturbance. The main examples of these rights are the rights 
to life, property, bodily integrity, respect for private life, personal liberty, open justice, 
                                                        
 Law Department, London School of Economics and Political Science. 
† I owe thanks to Paul Brand, Joshua Getzler, Michael Lobban, Grégoire Webber, and the journal’s 
referees for comments on earlier versions of this article. When quoting from old texts, I use modern 
orthography.  
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silence, legal protection, access to a judicial remedy, freedom of expression, freedom of 
conscience, freedom of assembly, freedom of movement, freedom of association, and 
freedom from arbitrary entry, search, and seizure. These rights are deemed 
fundamental not in the sense that they are unassailable, but rather in the sense that it 
would be a remarkably unwise parliament that did not consider it imperative that they 
never be restricted or removed without good cause.
1
 Parliament is entitled to repeal 
statutes and abrogate precedents which make these rights part of the law of the land, but 
politicians and political parties might suffer at the ballot box if they try to persuade 
parliament to do so.
2
 And although the judiciary cannot invalidate enacted laws, there is 
judicial dicta stretching back centuries to the effect that if parliament legislated 
unreasonably to remove or restrict rights of this kind, a court might take it upon itself to 
refuse to apply the relevant statutes or statutory provisions.
3
 Whether or not courts ever 
would presume to exercise this nuclear option, judges certainly can and do rely on 
interpretive principles and presumptions which require parliament to use unambiguous 
statutory language if a right is to be disturbed.
4
 The legislature has supreme law-making 
                                                        
1
 So it is that one sometimes finds British jurists and constitutional theorists depicting an unwise law as 
legal but unconstitutional: see e.g. Robert Chambers, A Course of Lectures on the English Law: 
Delivered at the University of Oxford, 1767-1773, 2 vols, ed TM Curley (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1986) I at 141 (“This act though not illegal, for the enaction of the supreme power is the definition of 
legality, was yet unconstitutional … contrary to the principles of the English government, and to the faith 
implicitly given to the[] constituents [of the members of the House of Commons]”); William Paley, 
Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, 2 vols (London: Faulder, 1791) II at 191 (“An act of 
parliament in England can never be unconstitutional, in the strict and proper acceptation of the term; 
[but] in a lower sense it may [be], viz when it militates with the spirit, or defeats the provision of other 
laws, made to regulate the form of government”); WS Holdsworth, A History of English Law, 3rd ed, 12 
vols (London: Methuen, 1922-48) II (1923) at 441-2 (“[F]undamental … mean[ing] the supremacy of a 
law which parliament could change”); IV (1924) at 186-7.  
2
 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Simms [2000] 2 AC 115 at 131 (Lord 
Hoffmann) (“The constraints upon … parliament are ultimately political, not legal…. Parliament must 
squarely confront what it is doing and accept the political cost”). 
3
 See e.g. Bonham’s Case (1610) 8 Co Rep 107a at 118a (Coke, CJ); Day v Savadge (1614) Hob 85 at 87 
(Hobart, CJ); R & R v Knollys [1694] Skin 517 at 526-7 (Holt, CJ); City of London v Wood (1702) 12 
Mod 669 at 687 (Holt, CJ); and, in modern times, R (Jackson and others) v A-G [2005] UKHL 56 at 
[102] (Lord Steyn); AXA Insurance v Lord Advocate [2011] UKSC 46 at [51] (Lord Steyn) (“It is not 
entirely unthinkable that a government … may seek to use it[s majority] to abolish judicial review or to 
diminish the role of the courts in protecting the interests of the individual. Whether this is likely to 
happen is not the point. It is enough that it might conceivably do so. The rule of law requires that the 
judges must retain the power to insist that legislation of that extreme kind is not law which the courts will 
recognise”).   
4
 See e.g. ex p Simms, supra note 2 at 131 (Lord Hoffmann) (“Fundamental rights cannot be overridden 
by general or ambiguous words…. In the absence of express language or necessary implication to the 
contrary, the courts … presume that even the most general words were intended to be subject to the basic 
rights of the individual. In this way the courts of the United Kingdom, though acknowledging the 
sovereignty of parliament, apply principles of constitutionality little different from those which exist in 
countries where the power of the legislature is expressly limited by a constitutional document”); also R 
(Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No 2) [2008] UKHL 61 at [45] 
(Lord Hoffmann).  
 3 
authority, in short, but abuse of this authority – scant regard for basic rights – could be 
politically costly and might encounter considerable resistance.  
 This article is concerned with one particular argument for speaking of rights as 
fundamental in the absence of a written constitution. The argument, expressed 
skeletally, is that a supreme law-maker – the argument was devised as a response to 
royal absolutism – should presume against disturbing unwritten constitutional 
arrangements, conventions, privileges, and liberties which people have enjoyed 
continuously throughout a prescription period. Although the argument has not gone 
unnoticed by historians, it appears to have engaged constitutional lawyers barely at all.
5
 
This could be because they find the argument unconvincing and insignificant, though it 
is more likely that they have simply not noted its difference from another, better-known 
argument concerning the antiquity of the common law constitution.  
 The argument from prescription is, in fact, distinctive and intriguing. To 
categorize a right as fundamental because of prescription is not to presume that the 
right is set down in a text, or that it would be self-evidently contrary to reason to treat 
the right as anything other than fundamental; the argument is not even that a 
fundamental right is an expression of tried reason which has stood the test of time. 
Rather, it is that some rights are fundamental because the people (or their political 
representatives) have availed themselves of those rights since a time legally identified as 
that before which the lawful origin of a right cannot be proved, so that lawful origin has 
to be inferred. Those who advanced this argument – mainly Whig historians in the 
second half of the seventeenth century – had hardly anything to say about why the 
existence of a right since a specific date should make that right fundamental. Nor were 
those making the argument always attentive to the distinction between prescription and 
custom: sometimes, their point was not that a right is to be treated as fundamental 
because it has existed throughout a prescription period, but that the persistence of a 
custom throughout the period made that custom part of the common law. (This 
conflation of prescription and custom probably explains why the argument from 
prescription tends not to be distinguished from claims regarding antiquity of the 
common law constitution.) It is interesting, nevertheless, to reflect – speculative though 
the reflections sometimes turn out to be – on those instances in which seventeenth 
                                                        
5 There are occasional cameo appearances: e.g. Joseph Jaconelli, “Do Constitutional Conventions Bind?” 
(2005) 64 Camb LJ 149 at 162 (“The idea that constitutional conventions could acquire force of law 
through a process similar to prescription has, at present, no basis in legal authority”).  
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century constitutional writers appealed to prescription as a concept in its own right, and 
on why they should have considered it significant that particular rights had (as they saw 
it) been prescriptively acquired.  
 In the next section I outline the common law of prescription, not only so that 
readers not familiar with it might understand it, but also so that readers might come to 
recognize that certain Stuart constitutional writers turned a refined doctrine of land 
obligations into a far less refined argument concerning fundamental rights. In section 
III, I consider the various ways in which prescription was invoked in seventeenth 
century constitutional discourse before concluding, in section IV, with some reflections 
on what was an unconvincing but not altogether unenlightening attempt at conceptual 
transplant.  
 
II  Prescription 
 
Most legal systems have rules or conventions whereby, after a period of time, 
somebody either is stripped of something they had or obtains something they did not 
have. The case of stripping is called extinctive prescription (or limitation): a right, or 
more accurately a right of action, prescribes (ceases to exist) because a specific period 
of time has passed during which someone holding that right of action failed to exercise 
it.
6
 The case of obtaining is called acquisitive prescription: a right prescribes (comes into 
being) because a specific period of time has passed during which somebody who did 
not hold that right acted – and was never challenged for acting – as if they did hold it. 
This article is primarily concerned with prescription as a mode of acquisition. 
 Acquisitive prescription appears to have been invented to remedy the 
deficiencies of another concept. According to the Roman law doctrine of usucapio, a 
transferee who in good faith purchased, inherited, or accepted as a gift property which 
the transferor did not own, would acquire dominium over that property by virtue of 
                                                        
6
 The lapse of a limitation period bars an action but does not necessarily extinguish the right. My failure 
to act within the period may debar me from bringing an action to recover my property from you, but if, 
within the limitation period, you have transferred the property to someone else, and if my right to the 
property is in rem, a new limitation period starts on transfer – so that my right survives against the 
transferee even though I no longer have an action against you. Even if my right to the property is in 
personam, it is still more accurate to think of the passing of the limitation period as bringing an end to my 
action rather than the right. If, for example, I failed to seek to recover the property within the period but 
you subsequently returned it to me anyway, you would have no right to reclaim that property, because 
limitation extinguishes an action to enforce a right to the property rather than the right itself. See Barry 
Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law, rev ed (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1975) at 120.  
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having been in continuous possession of it for a period of time (two years for land, one 
year for moveables).
7
 The most significant limitation of usucapio was that it did not 
apply to possession of provincial lands. In the late second century AD, the praetors 
supplemented usucapio by introducing a defence of longi temporis praescriptio, 
whereby a person with an original entitlement to land, provincial land included, was 
barred from asserting his rights to that land if the defendant had held it without 
interruption for ten years (if the parties lived in the same district) or twenty years (if they 
did not).
8
 The defence was originally thought of as extinctive: the defendant who 
successfully entered this plea saw a claimant’s right brought to an end owing to the 
claimant having failed to exercise his right within the relevant period. But by the fourth 
century AD, the standard explanation of longi temporis praescriptio seems to be not that 
the claimant lost but that the defendant acquired a right owing to his continuous 
possession having gone unchallenged.
9
  
 
A  COMMON LAW ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION 
 
This conception of prescription, whereby a right in land is acquired by virtue of 
uninterrupted use or enjoyment over a long period of time, makes its way into English 
law during the high middle ages. As in Roman law, the rules on acquisition have a 
connection to rules governing extinction. The relationship between the two sets of rules 
is not easily summarized. Medieval real actions for the recovery of possession of land 
(seisin) were subject to limitation by past events. In the late twelfth century, a claimant 
seeking to recover had to trace a right of seisin from ancestors who had held that right 
since – but not before – the accession of Henry I (5 August 1100). Around 1200, the 
reference point for establishing rightful seisin was changed to 1 December 1135 (the 
day of Henry I’s death). The Provisions of Merton 1236 changed the date again to the 
accession of Henry II (19 December 1154), and the first Statute of Westminster (1275) 
changed it yet again to the year of the coronation of Richard I (3 September 1189).
10
 
This last statute provides that: 
                                                        
7 Justinian, Inst, 2. 6 pr. (The one-year rule rarely applied, because in Roman the law the unauthorized 
transfer of the personal possessions of another nearly always constituted theft.)  
8
 C 7. 31. 1 pr; C 7. 33. 1 pr.   
9
 See HF Jolowicz and Barry Nicholas, Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law, 3rd ed 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1972) at 505-6. 
10
 Richard was in France on 6 July 1189 when his father (Henry II) died. Although Richard was entitled 
to the throne from that date, he did not accede to it until 3 September, the day of his coronation: 
 6 
in making the count of the descent [from the last ancestor in seisin] in a writ of right, no 
one shall presume to trace the seisin of his ancestor beyond seisin at the time of King 
Richard, uncle to [Henry III,] the father of [Edward I,] the king that now is.
11  
These rules regarding recovery of seisin were extinctive rather than acquisitive. 
A claimant’s inability to bring an action within the relevant limitation period either 
barred his remedy or raised the presumption that he (or an ancestor) had transferred 
lawful title to the land to the person (or an ancestor of the person) from whom he had 
hoped to recover. Bracton, who was most likely writing in the 1220s and 1230s, 
observed that an accession date, besides limiting the period of recovery, also fixed the 
point of legal memory: a claimant had to “specify a certain time and a certain king of 
whose time he talks” if he was to recover,12 and if he could not make his case within the 
relevant time period, he lost his right “for lack of proof.”13 Limiting an action for 
recovery to time since a coronation date militated against claimants bringing actions 
which depended on accounts of accounts: he who vouched for the claimant would be 
testifying that he saw for himself that the claimant’s ancestor had rightful seisin, not that 
he had known someone (no longer alive) who had said that the claimant’s ancestor had 
rightful seisin. Proof meant proof within living memory, and a coronation date 
established what exceeded living memory.  
The consequence for a claimant who could not bring evidence of rightful seisin 
since the relevant coronation date was clear enough. The more interesting questions 
came from the other direction. If someone possessed or enjoyed a plot of land during 
the prescription period without having been granted a right to do so – perhaps 
expecting to have to contend with an action for recovery of seisin but that action never 
having materialized, or having foundered – what, if anything, would he acquire? If he 
                                                                                                                                                              
Handbook of British Chronology, 2
nd
 ed F Maurice Powicke & EB Fryde (London: Offices of the Royal 
Historical Society, 1961) at 33.  
11
 Statute of Westminster I 1275 (3 Edw 1), c 39 (“en conte de decente en le bref de dreit qe nul ne seit 
oy por demaunder la seisine son auncestre de plus lointein seisine qe del tens le rey Richard, oncle le 
piere le Roy qe ore est”).  
12
 Henry de Bracton, De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae (London: Tottellum, 1569 [first printing]) at 
f 373b. [Bracton, De legibus.] 
13 Ibid at 438. See also Henry Rolle, Un abridgment des plusieurs cases et resolutions del common ley 
(London: Crooke, 1668) at 269 (“[W]hen by the statute of limitation the seisin in a writ of right was 
limited to the time of R 1 so that nobody could rely on a more ancient seisin, … though a man might 
prove to the contrary whereof the prescription was made … this should not destroy the prescription if the 
proof was of a thing before the said time of limitation, … for it would be hard to put juries to enquire of 
things so ancient”); also 268 (“a man cannot take advantage of an allegation of a basis for an action or 
other matter of fact occurring before time of memory, because it cannot be tried”).  
 7 
acquired anything, did acquisition depend on his having enjoyed whatever was acquired 
since a date fixed in a limitation statute?  
Consider, first, the question regarding the date. Bracton had accepted that 
easements and other incorporeal rights – to use a neighbour’s pathway, to fish in his 
stream, to mine his land, to take from his trees, and the like – could be acquired “by 
long use, with peaceful possession, continuous and uninterrupted, … provided that 
there has been no force, no stealth, and no permission (nec vi nec clam nec precario)” 
involved in the acquisition.
14
 But just how much time he thought had to pass before long 
use was established is not clear.
15
 That it was established because it could be shown to 
extend to a time beyond the memory of anyone alive is a proposition which he seems 
to have entertained,
16
 but he appears never to have maintained that a coronation date 
limiting recovery of seisin was to be used to settle whether a right had been 
prescriptively acquired. A similar observation might be made with regard to judges of 
the very early year book period. They certainly ruled that the prescriptive acquisition of 
an incorporeal right depended on nobody alive being able to provide testimony 
contradicting long and continuous user,
17
 and on the claimant’s assertions of user not 
being reliant on testimony “from time whereof there is no memory” (du temps dount il 
ny ad memorie
 
).
18
 But when settling whether incorporeal rights had been prescriptively 
acquired, these judges treated time beyond memory as a factual question (whether 
anyone alive can provide relevant testimony) rather than as presumption (that nobody 
alive can testify to events before a specific date). Like Bracton, they appear to have 
considered statutory coronation dates relevant only to extinctive prescription. 
More significant, for our purposes, is the question of what was acquired through 
prescription. It would be wrong, Pollock and Maitland observed, to say that a claimant’s 
                                                        
14 Bracton, De legibus, 223. The statement can be traced to D 43. 19. 1 (Ulpian).  
15 See John W Salmond, Essays in Jurisprudence and Legal History (London: Stevens & Haynes, 1891) 
at 107. 
16 See Bracton, De legibus, 230b (“longum tempus et longum usum … qui excedit memoriam 
hominum”), where Bracton is relying on D 43. 20. 3. 4 (Pomponius) (“Drawing off of water which goes 
back beyond memory [cuius origo memoriam excessit] is held as if constituted by right”). Bracton’s 
understanding of long user seems to have been based on usucapio. But Roman law had prohibited 
acquisition of incorporeal rights through usucapio: see D 8. 1. 14 pr; D 41. 3. 25 (Licinnius Rufinus) 
(“Without possession, there cannot be usucapio”).  
17
 See e.g. (1306) YB 205-6; (1305) YB 370-4. Acquisition would be stymied by evidence of interruption: 
see e.g. (1304) YB 264 (Bereford J) (“they have laid an interruption to your continuance, to which … you 
must answer…”).  
18
 The expression appears regularly in the year books: from the reigns of Edw. I & Edw. II see e.g. (1305) 
YB 45 (Bereford J); (1305) YB 431; (1306) YB 206-7; (1308) YB 29 (“du temps dount etc”); (1308-09) 
YB 129. It has various equivalents in Roman law: see FC von Savigny, System des heutigen Römischen 
Rechts, 8 vols (Berlin: Veit, 1840-49) IV (1841) at 481.  
 8 
right to recover expired because a prescription period had run its course, for the period 
has a fixed beginning but no fixed end, and so a claimant would be entitled to seek out 
testimony supporting his case for “some new and defeasible title”.19 But if the claimant 
could not find such testimony within living memory – a possibility which diminishes 
with the passing of time – the defendant’s enjoyment of the land would remain 
undisturbed. If it was impossible for the claimant to bring a fresh writ of right based on 
new testimony, his right to recover would be at an end, and his loss would be to the 
defendant’s gain. But what, exactly, did the defendant gain? Bracton wavered between 
presuming the defendant to have acquired a right binding against the entire world
20
 and 
presuming the right to be inchoate – to be a right which protected the defendant’s 
enjoyment of the property but which might still be defeated by writ and judgment.
21
 His 
preferred position, John Salmond thought, was that a right acquired through long and 
continuous enjoyment is to be presumed inchoate and defeasible.
22
 English law came to 
accept the opposite position: that prescriptively acquired rights vest title in the 
(incorporeal) thing acquired as if legal title to that thing has been expressly granted. The 
point is not that Bracton made the wrong call, or that he dithered, but that he seemed 
sensitive to the difficulty of explaining what sort of right vests by prescription. The 
seventeenth century writers to whom we turn in section III seemed unaware of this 
difficulty. Through prescription – this appears to have been the sum of their legal 
thinking – title can be acquired at common law. The significance of this proposition as 
applied to constitutional matters would remain obscure. 
Medieval lawyers writing after Bracton appreciated that there was some 
ambiguity about exactly how title was prescriptively acquired at common law. Thomas 
Littleton, writing late in the year book period, identified two conceptions of acquisitive 
prescription. There was the phenomenon identifiable in the earliest year books: “title of 
prescription … at the common law before any statute of limitation of writs … where[by] 
a man … shall say, that … [a] custom has been used from time whereof … when [the] a 
matter is pleaded … no man then alive had heard any proof of the contrary; nor had no 
                                                        
19 Frederick Pollock and Frederic William Maitland, The History of English Law before the Time of 
Edward I, 2
nd
 ed, 2 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968 [1898]) II at 141. 
20
 See Bracton, De legibus, 229b; also Pollock and Maitland, supra note 19 at 142.  
21 See Bracton, De legibus, 230b; also ibid at 53 (long and uninterrupted use protected so that the user 
cannot be defeated without writ and judgment (ita quod taliter utens sine brevi et iudicio eici non 
poterit)).  
22 Salmond, supra note 15 at 110.  
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knowledge to the contrary.”23 But there was also “a title of prescription” understood 
according to the statutory limitation on recovery of seisin (which, for Littleton, ran 
“from the time of king Richard the First after the Conquest, as is given by the statute of 
Westminster the First”24), whereby a failed action for recovery was presumed to vest 
lawful title in the person in possession of the land.  
Littleton refers to legal reasoning about testimony within memory and the 
statute on recovery as “diverse opinions”25 – things that people “have said”26 – about 
prescription. Although the two versions of prescription had evolved as discrete bodies 
of law – the first concerning the acquisition of incorporeal rights and the second limiting 
rights to recover land – he did not treat them thus. That he should not have done so is 
understandable since, certainly by the early 1300s (and possibly earlier), attorneys and 
judges were quite regularly using the limitation date established in the first Statute of 
Westminster analogously so as to fix the outer limit of the prescription period for the 
acquisition of easements and other incorporeal hereditaments.
27
 When considering 
acquisitive prescription claims, judges gradually stopped interpreting “time out of mind” 
literally, as meaning “beyond the memory of anyone still alive”, and instead took it to 
mean “before the beginning of the reign of Richard I”.28 
So the year 1189, which in 1275 had been set to limit the period within which a 
person could seek a remedy, came to be used to affirm a right: if there was evidence of 
long and uninterrupted enjoyment of land dating back to 1189 then, since matters 
before that date were legally beyond memory and could not be proved, it would be 
presumed that the person asserting enjoyment (typically, an easement) was using the 
land pursuant to a right recognized by the holder of the freehold before 1189.
29
  
                                                        
23 Thomas Littleton, Tenures, ed E Wambaugh (Washington, DC: Byrne & Co., 1903) at 81-2 (§ 170). 
Littleton’s Tenures was first published in 1481, though it was written in the 1450s.  
24 Ibid at 81.  
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid at 81, 82.  
27
 See e.g. De La More v Thwing (1308-09) YB 176 at 178; The King v Wickham Breaux (1313) YB 
179, 180; also Bryant v Foot (1866-7) LR 2 QB 161 at 180 (Cockburn, CJ). It is only around 1300 that 
the association of a statutory limitation date with the limit of legal memory starts to become particularly 
evident, Brand observes, though he uncovers one case from 1247 in which a limitation statute is used to 
fix the outer limit of the prescription period for the acquisition of an easement: Paul Brand, “Lawyers’ 
Time in England in the later Middle Ages”, in Time in the Medieval World, ed C Humphrey & WM 
Ormrod (York: York Medieval Press, 2001) 73-104 at 103. 
28 See AWB Simpson, A History of the Land Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) at 109-10. 
29 Whether the presumption was that the freeholder must actually have granted this right, as opposed to 
having accepted it as a customary right, is not clear: not until the seventeenth century does there appear 
to be any evidence of judges directing jurors to presume the existence of a lost grant. See James v Trollop 
(1685) Skin 239; and 2 Show KB 439.  
 10 
Most seventeenth-century constitutional writers who invoked prescription 
treated Richard I’s coronation as the date fixing the acquisitive prescription period 
(some referred to prescription without mentioning a date). Common lawyers, by 
contrast, had, by the seventeenth century, become somewhat disenchanted with 1189. 
Edward Coke reports a case from 1606 in which it was proved that the land right being 
claimed had not existed since 1189, though it had existed for over three centuries. It 
would be absurd, Lord Ellesmere thought, to rule that the right therefore could not be 
prescriptively acquired. “[A]ll shall be presumed to be done, which might make the 
ancient appropriation good…. God forbid that ancient grants and acts should be drawn 
in question” because continuous enjoyment over three centuries (“after the death of all 
the parties, and after so many successions of ages”) fell short of what was “necessary to 
the perfection of the thing”.30  
This was not rebellion. The court, led by Ellesmere, reached its decision “upon 
consideration of precedents”.31 The use of 1189 as an extinctive prescription date ended 
in 1540, when Henry VIII introduced a limitation statute requiring that testimony in 
support of a writ of right be brought in the sixty years before commencement of suit.
32
 It 
would have been an obvious step for the courts thereafter to stop referring to 1189 
altogether and to apply the sixty-year limitation rule in cases concerning the prescriptive 
acquisition of easements and other incorporeal rights as well. But – to the bewilderment 
of Blackstone and others – this never happened.33 Nevertheless, from as early as the 
second half of the fourteenth century, judges had sometimes been circumventing 
evidentiary problems arising out of the commitment to 1189 by instructing juries that 
they should presume that long user could be traced back to that year if there was 
evidence of continuous use for the period of actual living memory.
34
 Ellesmere had 
espied one reason for the drift towards this presumption: generations of uninterrupted 
                                                        
30
 Bedle v Beard (1606) 12 Co Rep 4 at 5.  
31
 Ibid.  
32 32 Hen 8, c 2.  
33 See Blackstone, 2 Commentaries 31 (“since … th[e] period (in a writ of right) has been reduced to sixty 
years, it seems unaccountable, that the date of legal prescription or memory should still continue to be 
reckoned from an era so very antiquated”); also Angus v Dalton (1877) 3 QBD 85 at 104 (Cockburn, CJ) 
(“[T]he judges … presumed that the right claimed had existed from time of legal memory, that is to say, 
from the time of Richard I. This convenient rule having been established, the judges seem not to have 
thought it worthwhile, when the statute of 31 [sic] Hen 8, c 2 was passed, by which in a writ of right the 
time was limited to sixty years, to apply, by an analogous use of that statute, the time of prescription 
established by it to actions involving rights to incorporeal hereditaments”).  
34
 See Salmond, supra note 15 at 115-7; also Alan Wharam, “The 1189 Rule: Fact, Fiction or Fraud?” 
(1972) 1 Anglo-Am L Rev 262 at 269.  
 11 
enjoyment of appurtenant land could be found to be insufficient to establish an 
easement by prescription if that enjoyment would have been impossible in 1189. But 
there was another reason: judges were sometimes ruling that a right had been 
prescriptively acquired because there was no evidence of enjoyment being interrupted 
since 1189, notwithstanding that the mode of enjoyment would have been impossible in 
the twelfth century!
35
 A strict rule that incorporeal rights prescribed if nobody 
demonstrated interruption to their enjoyment since 1189 produced absurdities, and so 
the courts gradually began to favour the presumption that a right had existed since 
1189, and had therefore prescribed, if uninterrupted enjoyment could be proved within 
living memory.
36
 Seventeenth century constitutional writers never adopted this 
presumption. 
 
B  PRESCRIPTION AND CUSTOM 
 
In English common law, the coronation of Richard I still divides time beyond and time 
within legal memory: an incorporeal right cannot be prescriptively acquired (though it is 
                                                        
35 See e.g. The Case of the King’s Prerogative in Saltpetre (1606) 12 Co Rep 12, where Coke treats 
digging for saltpeter for the manufacture of gunpowder as an immemorial custom of the realm, even 
though gunpowder production in Britain appears not to have started until around the mid-fourteenth 
century. There are later cases in the same vein: e.g. Fitch v Rawling (1795) 2 H Bl 393, where a 
customary right to play lawful games, sports and pastimes in a particular place at all seasonable times of 
the year was held to justify the playing of cricket, even though cricket was unknown during the reign of 
Richard I and would have been unlawful for some time thereafter.  
36
 Prescription was codified by parliament in the 1830s. In the mid-eighteenth century, judges began to 
direct juries that they should presume enjoyment since 1189 if there was evidence of continuous user for 
at least twenty years: the first case in which this presumption was used appears to be Lewis v Price (1761) 
2 Wms Saund 172 (see esp at 175a). The courts, in introducing this presumption, were applying by 
analogy the period beyond which various possessory actions such as ejectment were barred under the 
Limitation Act 1623 (21 Jac 1, c 16). Since the presumption of enjoyment could be, and quite often was, 
rebutted by evidence that a right being claimed could not have existed in 1189, judges started to resort to 
another presumption: that evidence of continuous user for more than 20 years raised the presumption 
that the prescriptively acquired right had been granted to someone since 1189 but that evidence of the 
grant had been lost. The courts were unclear whether this presumption was conclusive or rebuttable. In 
1799, the court of common pleas held that a claimant could not challenge a grant presumed in favour of 
the defendant after 23 years’ continuous user: Holcroft v Heel (1799) 1 Bos & Pull 400. Four years later, 
the king’s bench ruled that there were circumstances in which such a presumption could be displaced: 
Campbell v Wilson (1803) 3 East 294. Two decades later still, Abbot CJ, in the same court, remarked 
that it is correct to instruct jurors that 20 years’ uninterrupted user should (so long as “there is nothing in 
the usage to contravene the public policy” or that is “against any known rule or principle of law”) be 
treated as “cogent evidence” that the practice has existed since time immemorial: R v Joliffe (1823) 2 B & 
C 54 at 59. Parliament resolved the uncertainty in 1832. Under s 2 of the Prescription Act 1832, 
evidence of 20 years’ user establishes a strong presumption that, at some point earlier, a (now lost) grant 
of the prescriptively acquired right was made. The presumption is practically unassailable because it can 
only be rebutted by proof that the grant could not have been made in the time before the prescription 
period but after 1189. In any event, once user has run for 40 years, the prescriptively acquired right 
becomes absolute.  
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almost inconceivable that anyone would nowadays hope to acquire such a right through 
the common law) if there is evidence countering presumption of enjoyment stretching 
back to 1189. The date is also used to define immemorial custom. But immemorial 
custom is also sometimes described as prescriptive custom. From their inception, the 
year books contain numerous instances of title being established by prescription 
because a local custom has existed from time immemorial.
37
 Local “custom … used by 
title of prescription”, Littleton observed, is custom “from time out of mind.”38  
If a customary right is a prescriptively acquired right, what distinguishes custom 
and prescription? Coke, commenting on Littleton, drew a distinction which was already 
present in the law reports.
39
 He conceded that “both … customs and prescriptions” 
involve the same “two … incidents … viz. possession or usage [which “must be long, 
continual, and peacable”], and time.”40 But “in the common law” prescription “is a title 
which is … for the most part applied to persons”, whereas “a custom, which is local, is 
alleged in no person, but laid within some manor or other place.”41 To determine that 
title has vested by prescription is to say that a particular person has acquired a right as if 
that right had been legally granted to him. But to determine that a local custom is legally 
binding, because it is immemorial and has therefore prescribed, is to establish law 
applicable to and for the benefit of everyone within the community where that custom 
operates. The distinction is significant for our purposes, because prescriptive arguments 
invoked by seventeenth century constitutional writers are sometimes arguments about 
prescribed customs and at other times about how the king ought not to suspend or 
dispense with certain rights enjoyed by his subjects because his subjects had acquired 
those rights by prescription. It is to these arguments that we turn next. 
                                                        
37 See e.g. (1292) YB 136; (1294) YB 512; (1304) YB 262; Coventry v Grauntpie (1308-09) YB 71 at 73; 
Noyers v Colwick (1312) YB 141 at 142-3.  
38 Littleton, supra note 23 at 81. In the seventeenth century, Finch explained immemorial common law in 
essentially the same way: see Henry Finch, Law or a Discourse Thereof, 1759 ed (New York: Kelley, 
1969 [1627]) at 77.  
39 See e.g. Rolles v Mason (1608) 1 Brownl 132 at 133 (“a prescription goes to one man, and a custom to 
many”); Harrison v Rooke (1625) Palm 420 at 420 (“there is a difference between prescription which 
goes to the person [va al person], & custom, which is local”). For later expressions of the same point, see 
Putter v North (1673) 1 Vent 383 at 386; Samuel Carter, Lex Custumaria, or, A Treatise of Copy-hold 
Estates (London: Walthoe, 1696) at 37; Cock v Vivian (1734) Kel W 203 at 206; Blackstone, 2 
Commentaries 263; Padwick v Knight (1852) 7 Ex 854 at 857-8; Mercer v Denne [1904] 2 Ch 534 at 
556; Thomas H Carson, Prescription and Custom (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1907) at 5, 112-3.  
40 Coke, 1 Commentary upon Littleton 113b.  
41 Ibid at 113a-113b. Prescription sometimes went to entities as well as to individuals. For example, 
medieval English law did not entirely discount the possibility of corporations prescriptively acquiring title 
to profitable franchises: see Paul Brand, The Making of the Common Law (London: Hambledon Press, 
1992) at 403-4, 427-34. 
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III  Prescribed fundamentals? 
 
Modern English constitutional lawyers tend to see the seventeenth century as time of 
struggle between parliament and the courts, with nobody doubting that law-making 
authority was eventually confirmed as resting in parliament but with scholars diverging 
over what the higher judiciary thought it could do if parliament were to legislate against 
common right and reason. The primary legal power struggle in the seventeenth century 
was not between parliament and the courts, however, but between parliament and the 
crown. Although, after the Restoration settlement of 1660, Charles II was less 
dismissive of parliament than his father had been, events of the following decade – 
particularly the king’s attempt to extend religious liberties to Catholics and his 
opposition to efforts to exclude his Catholic brother from succeeding to the throne – 
reinvigorated parliament’s concerns about monarchs ignoring its will and abrogating its 
laws. When James II, Charles’s brother, did accede to the throne in 1685, many of his 
actions – the use of prerogative to dispense with and suspend laws without parliament’s 
consent, the removal of freeholders’ property rights without due process of law, the 
efforts to rig parliamentary elections, and so on – made these fears well founded. It is 
possible to detect, in seventeenth century constitutional discourse, five prescription-
based arguments which are essentially pleas to the monarch that he recognize limits to 
his prerogative.  
 
A  A PRESCRIBED PARLIAMENT? 
 
“The king has a superior, namely God”, Bracton reputedly remarked; “[a]lso, the law 
by which he was made king.”42 In his Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes 
(1643), the barrister and polemicist, William Prynne, seized on this remark as support 
for the argument that “law and parliament” are “above the king” (whose actions “are 
and must be subject” to the courts).43 His argument hinted at prescription. Since there 
                                                        
42 Bracton, De Legibus, 34. (This statement appears not to have been part of Bracton’s original 
manuscript. It may have been added by Bracton as an afterthought or it could be the work of an 
anonymous interpolator: see Brian Tierney, “Bracton on Government” (1963) 38 Speculum 296 at 310-
16.) 
43
 William Prynne, The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes (London: Sparke, 1643) at 34, 
and also (for the reference to Bracton) 5. On how a seventeenth century constitutionalist – and Bracton – 
could assert without contradiction that a king was subject to God and law, see Howard Nenner, By 
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were “laws and kingdoms before [there were] kings”, parliament had acquired ultimate 
law-making authority (“[l]egislative power is more in the parliament than in the king, if 
not wholly in it”) as if by long and uninterrupted enjoyment.44 Not only was the Long 
Parliament within its rights to declare in March 1642, in the absence of Charles I, that 
its ordinances would be binding laws, Prynne insisted, but the king had not been within 
his rights to absent himself: “[t]he king is bound by all means possible to be present at 
the parliament” when it is summoned because this has been the convention since 
“[w]hen parliaments were first begun”.45  
 Prynne’s commitment to this argument was short-lived. The king was not above 
the law, he maintained in 1648, but neither was parliament sovereign. Rather, law-
making power was shared between them. Although he had adopted a new argument, 
his reasoning was still rooted in prescription. “This right of theirs [parliament and the 
king] is confirmed by prescription and custom from the very first beginning of 
parliaments in this kingdom till this present”.46 The new argument superficially 
resembled another one: that legislative power was entrusted to the king, lords, and 
commons as distinct but co-ordinated powers. This argument – which would become 
Whig orthdoxy
47
 – was advanced by a clergyman, Charles Herle, after Charles I rejected 
parliament’s Nineteen Propositions in June 1642. “England’s is not a simply 
subordinative, and absolute, but a coordinative, and mixed monarchy”, Herle claimed, 
“compounded of 3 co-ordinate estates, a king and two houses of parliament”.48 As with 
Prynne in 1643, Herle alluded to prescription: 
what is meant by … fundamental laws of this kingdom … is that original frame of this 
coordinate government of the 3 estates in parliament consented to, and contrived by 
the people in its first constitution, and since … confirmed by … constant custom time 
(as we say) out of mind, wherein the rule is [that] … it cannot be disproved from taking 
                                                                                                                                                              
Colour of Law: Legal Culture and Constitutional Politics in England, 1660-1689 (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1977) at 55-7.  
44 Prynne, supra note 43 at 49.  
45 Ibid at 43.  
46
 William Prynne, A Plea for the Lords (London: Spark, 1648) at 3. 
47 See e.g. W[illiam] D[isney], Nil dictum quod non dictum prius, or, the Case of the Government of 
England Established by Law (London: printed by AB, 1681) at 25-37.  
48 Charles Herle, A Fuller Answer to a Treatise Written by Dr Ferne (London: Bartlet, 1642) at 3. Herle 
was not the first to argue thus. Fortescue made essentially the same claim in the fifteenth century: see 
John Fortescue (d 1479), “In Praise of the Laws of England” (1st publ 1468x71), in Fortescue, On the 
Laws and Governance of England, tr SB Chrimes, ed S Lockwood (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997) 1-
80 at 27-8.  
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place upon all occasions, therefore it is to be presumed to have continued from the 
beginning, … even before … record.49 
But Herle and Prynne were not of the same mind. Certainly neither accepted 
royal absolutism, both asserted that parliament shared legislative power with the king, 
and both sought to make their assertions credible by arguing that parliament had 
existed since time immemorial. Yet their positions differed in one crucial respect. For 
Herle, sovereignty lay in the lords and commons with the king because of the antiquity 
of all three estates. Those who regarded the king’s authority to be subordinate only to 
divine law considered this argument easily derailed, for the establishment of the 
commons as an independent estate was within living memory: the king’s tenured 
subjects were certainly being summoned to parliament in 1100, at the beginning of 
Henry I’s reign, one royalist writer observed, but the commons was not recognized as a 
representative body of the kingdom until the mid-thirteenth century.
50
 Prynne was a 
curiosity, for he insisted on the antiquity of parliament but – as the title of his 1648 
essay made clear – he was specifically making a plea for the lords.51 The lords had 
prescriptively-acquired rights which entitled them to legislate in co-ordination with the 
king, he argued, but on the matter of the commons he was in agreement with those who 
insisted on the king’s divine right: evidence of the commons’ long and uninterrupted 
enjoyment of law-making powers equal to those of the king simply did not exist.  
After the Restoration, Charles II appointed Prynne as keeper of the records in 
the Tower of London. It was in this capacity that Prynne uncovered bundles of old 
writs of summons and other parliamentary records which he believed refuted the 
possibility of an immemorial commons.
52
 As early as 1660 he was claiming that his 
investigations “made good to all the world, by records, precedents, judgements in 
parliament, law, reason, and divinity too, that the whole House of Commons, in its 
greatest fullness, freedom and power, never had any lawful right or authority” to make 
laws in co-ordination with the king and the lords.
53
 “[I]t indisputably appears, that 
                                                        
49
 Herle, supra note 48 at 8.  
50 See Robert Filmer, Free-Holders [sic] Grand Inquest, Touching our Sovereign Lord the King and His 
Parliament (London: s.n., 1680 [1648]) at 16-18. (That Filmer was the author is disputed. Others have 
attributed the tract to Charles I’s attorney general, Robert Holbourne.)  
51
 See Corinne C Weston & Janelle R Greenberg, Subjects and Sovereigns: The Grand Controversy over 
Legal Sovereignty in Stuart England (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1981) at 124-148, 318-325.  
52 For details of the writs, see William Prynne, Brevia Parliamentaria Rediviva (London: Thomas, 1662) 
at 4-135. 
53 William Prynne, The Second part of a Brief Register and Survey of the Several Kinds and Forms of 
Parliamentary Writs (London: Childe & Parry, 1660) at 178-9. 
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parliaments, or general councils, are coeval with the kingdom itself”, Blackstone would 
observe a century later, but it “has been a matter of great dispute among our learned 
antiquarians … whether the commons were summoned at all; or, if summoned, at what 
period they began to form a distinct assembly.”54 Blackstone was intent on staying clear 
of this dispute.
55
 But seventeenth century Whig historians, who wanted to establish that 
the commons as well as the lords shared legislative power with the king in parliament, 
had to contend with the charge that prescription proved that the commons could not be 
an equally-ranked, genuinely co-ordinate third estate.  
Their principal response to this charge was that prescription in fact established 
rather than rebutted the case for an immemorial commons. The Revolution confirmed 
that the commons was subordinate to neither the lords nor the king, James Tyrrell 
asserted, and the pity was that anyone should have presumed otherwise – for “proof of 
the constant claim the commons have made before the king and lords in parliament … 
is by prescription”.56 If it is accepted that “time of memory in a prescription was from 
the time of King Richard I”, and that “time out of mind … extends beyond” that date, 
then the uninterrupted existence of the commons as a distinct estate can be traced, he 
insisted, not only throughout the prescription period but beyond it.
57
 For in Anglo-
Saxon times, “the commons of England were a constituent part of the Witenagemot, or 
common council of the nation, … and if it does not appear that they were deprived of 
that right by the Norman’s entrance … I think we may very well conclude that things 
continued in the same state … after [the] Conquest as they did before.”58 If this 
conclusion was correct, “the commons [could] … make as strong a claim by 
prescription for themselves and their ancestors … as the king could make for himself 
and his ancestors”.59  
                                                        
54
 Blackstone, 1 Commentaries 145. 
55
 Ibid (“… it is not my intention here to enter into controversies of this sort”).  
56 James Tyrrell, The General History of England, both Ecclesiastical and Civil, 3 vols (London: Rogers, 
1704) III, pt 1 at 213 (advertisement).  
57 James Tyrrell, Bibliotheca Politica: Or, an Enquiry into the Ancient Constitution of the English 
Government, 2
nd
 ed (London: Darby, 1727 [1
st
 ed 1694]) at 423, 425. The first edition is composed of 
thirteen “dialogues” which Tyrrell wrote between 1692 and 1694, a fourteenth dialogue being added to 
the second edition when it first appeared in 1701. Tyrrell, who died in 1718, presents the case for an 
immemorial commons mainly in the seventh and eighth dialogues.  
58 Ibid at 390. Essentially the same point is made ibid at 266. 
59 Ibid at 420. See also George Lawson (d 1678), Politica Sacra et Civilis (London: printed for JS, 1689 
[1660]) at 157-8 (“by commons, some may understand only the plebeian rank, yet … we find in that 
House men of as good birth, estates, and as eminent virtues, as many of the lords be…. [T]he truth is, if 
the whole assembly be considered as one representative, they are all peers, … barons by tenure and 
ancient prescription since the time of William the Elder [sc William II], or by writ, or by patent”); Roger 
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 Tyrrell had elaborated on Herle’s claim that the commons had existed as an 
institution since time immemorial, but he had not rendered it more convincing. By the 
seventeenth century, we have seen, common lawyers were no longer fully committed to 
the idea that it must be possible to trace enjoyment back to 1189 if a right to that 
enjoyment was to be prescriptively acquired; proof of enjoyment within actual living 
memory was sometimes taken to suffice. But Tyrrell interpreted prescription strictly: 
for a right to prescribe, the activity or institution which formed the basis of that right 
had to be in continuous evidence since the coronation of Richard I. The commons had 
acquired the right to be recognized as a co-ordinate third estate, he believed, because it 
had existed since – indeed, existed long before – that date.  
Tyrrell was by no means a lone voice. “Our government by a king and estates of 
parliament,” Thomas Hunt asserted, “is as ancient as anything [that] can be 
remembered…. [I]t is established, and for ages and immemorial time has thus 
continued; a long succession of kings have recognized it to be such”.60 But had there 
really been estates of parliament – king, lords, and commons – since time immemorial? 
Not until the thirteenth century did parliament – a term which only becomes a 
description for large assemblies in the 1230s – begin to meet regularly and in the same 
place; only then did it start to become something more than an elite gathering of 
bishops, earls, and barons, and it would be at least another century before the 
representation of counties, towns, and cities began to resemble a separate parliamentary 
estate.
61
 “[T]ruly, legally and properly understood either now or anciently,” one royalist 
observed in 1687, “the word Estate cannot bear … any other … interpretation … than a 
party … of men elected by a community”.62 It was wishful thinking to insist that there 
was, within the assemblies of post-Conquest England (let alone the pre-Conquest witan), 
a commons equating to a party of men in parliament.
63
  
                                                                                                                                                              
Acherley, The Britannic Constitution: Or, the Fundamental Form of Government in Britain (London: 
Bettesworth, 1727) at 116-7 (“from the old times, whereof there are no memorials to the contrary, the 
exercise of this form of government [‘consisting of the three estates of king, lords, and commons’] … have 
been … in all times used and practiced…. The memorials are unquestionable, that … William … the 
Conqueror, assembled the commune regni concilium; by which … parliament, or the two estates of lords 
and commons, were always meant and understood”).  
60 Thomas Hunt, Mr Hunt’s Postscript for Rectifying Some Mistakes in Some of the Inferiour Clergy 
(London: printed for the author, 1682) at 2.  
61 See JR Maddicott, The Origins of the English Parliament, 924-1327 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010) at 
157, 161-4, 226-8.  
62
 Fabian Philipps, The Established Government of England, Vindicated from all Popular and 
Republican Principles and Mistakes (London: printed for the author, 1687) at 656.  
63 “To apply ‘prescription’ in this very technical sense, to the claims of the House of Commons [sc, ‘that 
all such rights must rest upon prescription, and must … have existed from the time of Richard I’], would 
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B  A RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION? 
 
Whig historians appeared to have invoked prescription to make a case not for 
recognizing particular rights as fundamental but rather for accepting – as integral to the 
unwritten constitution – the legislative authority of the commons within parliament. The 
case was easy to dismiss if it depended entirely on the assertion that the commons as an 
institution must have existed adamantine since 1189. But the Whigs had another string 
to their bow. The commons might not have emerged as a representative body of the 
kingdom until the mid-thirteenth century, but freemen had long been represented at 
parliamentary – and, before the time of parliament, conciliar – assemblies. Was there 
not – leaving aside the question of the provenance and status of the commons as an 
estate – a prescribed right to representation? Prynne thought not, but summarized the 
argument neatly: “the true original title and right of all our ancient cities [and] boroughs, 
electing and sending burgesses and citizens to our parliaments, is prescription time out 
of mind, long before the Conquest, it being a privilege they actually and of right enjoyed 
in Edward the Confessor’s time, or before, and exercised ever since.”64  
The argument, Prynne observed, could be traced to an Elizabethan antiquarian 
and justice of the peace, William Lambarde, who thought that even as early as the tenth 
century, “in every quarter of the realm, a great many … boroughs” were “send[ing] 
burgesses to the parliament”.65 Just as “written authorities … confirm our assertion of 
this continuance of this manner of parliament”, Lambarde claimed, “so is there also 
unwritten law, or prescription, that doth no less infallibly uphold the same.”66 But his 
elaboration of the claim is marked by understandable diffidence. The Anglo-Saxon 
common council “is … so ancient, and so long since decayed,” he conceded, “that it 
cannot be showed that [the burgesses] have been of any reputation at any time since the 
Conquest, and much less that they have obtained … privilege”.67  
                                                                                                                                                              
strip them of all privilege. The House cannot be shown to have existed, as a separate branch of the 
legislature, at that remote period.” Cassidy v Steuart (1841) 2 Man & G 437 at 467 n 52 (Tindal, CJ).  
64 Prynne, supra note 52 at 230.  
65 William Lambarde, Archeion, or, A Discourse upon the High Courts of Justice in England (London: 
Seile, 1635) at 257. (The manuscript of Archeion was completed by 1591, and may well have been 
completed earlier: see Paul L Ward, “William Lambarde’s Collections on Chancery” (1953) 7 Harv Lib 
Bull 271 at 274. Lambarde (sometimes spelled “Lambard”) died in 1601.) 
66 Lambarde, supra note 65 at 257. 
67 Ibid at 258.  
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On what was Lambarde’s thinking based? He was convinced – as was Coke – 
that the “prescribed” custom of the better appointed Anglo-Saxon boroughs (“of 
ancient demesne”) was to opt not to send burgesses to council, and that from this it was 
reasonable to infer that council would have been willing to admit representatives from 
less privileged boroughs (“other places”), and that these boroughs would have opted to 
send representatives (would have adopted “a contrary usage of the self-same thing”).68 
But Lambarde was careful not to present the inference as proof that the “commonality 
of the realm”69 had a prescriptively acquired right to representation in parliament.  
Various seventeenth-century parliamentarians were more forthright. “[T]he 
[Anglo-Saxon] assemblies” which “the king convened”, William Dugdale asserted, 
“include[d] the representatives of the people, or commons”, with some English 
counties and boroughs “having ever since prescribed to be privileged from sending 
burgesses to parliament” while “other places did send burgesses”; “it must … follow”, 
accordingly, “that there were parliaments before” the Conquest.70 Roger Twysden wrote 
similarly of how “it cannot be concluded” that, “because sometimes the lords are only 
remembered to have met”, the “commons were not parties to what passed in th[e] great 
[Anglo-Saxon] assemblies”; for if it is accepted that “no custom can begin since 1 R 1”, 
it follows that “the sending [of] … burgesses to parliament” – which began “before that 
king’s time” – must be a “common custom of the realm”.71 Tyrrell, agreeing with 
Lambarde (“the right to sit in parliament” enjoyed by the commonality had existed 
“time out of mind, that is, by prescription”72), sought to make Lambarde’s argument 
more convincing by drawing attention to legislation from Richard II’s reign which, 
according to Tyrrell, established that an immemorial right to parliamentary 
representation by “singular persons and commonalities” was accepted by parliament in 
                                                        
68 See ibid at 258-9. For Coke, see “To the Reader” [c 1612], in The Ninth Part of the Reports of Sir 
Edward Coke, Knt, in thirteen parts complete, 7 vols, ed G Wilson (London: Rivington & Sons, 1777) V 
at v-*v (“It is evident that there were tenants in ancient demesne before the conquests…. [T]hese tenants 
… had … privileges … and … before and in the Conqueror’s time … were not to be returned burgesses to 
serve in parliament…. [T]herefore there were parliaments unto which … burgesses were summoned both 
before and in the reign of the Conqueror”).  
69 Lambarde, supra note 65 at 262.  
70
 William Dugdale, Origines Juridiciales (London: Warren, 1666) at 15.  
71 Roger Twysden, Certaine Considerations upon the Government of England, ed JM Kemble (London: 
Camden Society, 1849 [c 1648]) at 126. Cf Nathaniel Bacon’s (anti-royalist) An Historical Discourse of 
the Laws and Government of England (London: Walbanke, 1647) at 278 (“[I]n the time of Ri I, … the 
truth is, that … although … it was ordinary for kings to make a show of summoning parliaments, … 
properly they were but parliamentary meetings of … lords, clergy, and others, as the king saw most 
convenient to drive on his own design”).  
72
 Tyrrell, supra note 57 at 434. 
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the 1380s.
73
 The legislation in fact established something else: that some individuals had 
been summoned, and some communities summoned to send representatives, to 
parliament, since “old times” (dauncienete), and that there were likely to be financial 
penalties imposed on those who were summoned but did not comply.
74
 
 The historians who followed in Lambarde’s wake were nevertheless trying to 
provide evidence, rather than simply arguing that it was reasonable to infer, that 
burgesses had been returned to council since time immemorial. Their main discovery, 
from the earliest chancery rolls, was that the borough of St Albans had been sending 
burgesses to great council meetings as early as 1199 – surely enough, some thought, to 
make the case that the right to representation was affirmed by prescription.
75
 Nobody 
mined this particular seam more tirelessly than did William Petyt in his highly 
influential essay in support of parliamentary sovereignty, The Antient Right of the 
Commons of England Asserted (1680). “[T]he claim and prescription of the borough 
of St Albans … to send two burgesses to all parliaments” served to “admit and confirm 
the general prescription, that there were boroughs” which “were always accustomed to 
send two burgesses to parliament in all former ages,” Petyt insisted, “not only in the 
time of E 1 but … in King John’s time”.76 Only “in vain” could one “oppose or 
contradict their [i.e., the commons’] just and ancient right” to representation.77  
One English republican wrote in the early 1680s of how he had been “inclined 
to believe that … our … commonality had not formally assembled in parliament” until 
the late-thirteenth century, but that after reading “the learned discourses lately 
published by Mr Petit [sic]” he was “fully convinced that it was otherwise”.78 Royalist 
and high Tory writers, by contrast, were completely unmoved. That a king tolerated 
                                                        
73 Ibid.  
74 5 Rich 2, s 2, c 4 (“the king … command[s] … that all singular persons and commonalities which … have 
the summons of parliament, shall come … as they are bound to do, and [have] been accustomed within 
the realm of England of old times. And if any … come not at the said summons … he shall be amerced 
…”). Tyrrell mistakenly refers to c 5.  
75 See e.g. Tyrrell, supra note 56 at III, pt 1, 63-4, 67-8, 189, 199-200; Robert Atkyns, The Power, 
Jurisdiction and Priviledge of Parliament; and the Antiquity of the House of Commons Asserted 
(London: Goodwin, 1689) at 24.  
76 William Petyt, The Antient Right of the Commons of England Asserted, or, A Discourse Proving by 
Records and the Best Historians that the Commons of England were ever an Essential Part of Parliament 
(London: Smith, 1680) at 7, 10, 9 (first argument). 
77 Ibid at 12 (first argument), and see also ibid at 12 (preface) (“it is apparent and past all contradiction 
that the commons in th[e Saxon and Norman] ages were an essential part of the legislative power”).  
78 Henry Neville, Plato Redivivus, 2nd ed (London: Dew, 1681 [1st ed 1680]) at 109-10. (Neville also 
acknowledges William Atwood, to whom we come in a moment.) 
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parliament’s petitions did not equate to a right to parliamentary representation.79 Even if 
it were correct to speak of a right to representation, furthermore, prescriptive 
acquisition of that right depended on evidence of uninterrupted enjoyment for a very 
long period of time. Tenants-in-chief, holding land directly from the king, could be 
summoned to parliament in the early thirteenth century, Henry Spelman had 
concluded in his Archaeologus (1626), but burgesses were not tenured at that time – 
this much was evident, he thought, from the wording of clause 14 of the first Magna 
Carta (“we will cause to be summoned … earls and greater barons …”).80 The right of 
burgesses to sit in parliament must, accordingly, have been established after 1189. For 
the royalist, Robert Brady, there was no compelling evidence of commons 
representation before 1265 (49 Hen 3), and it was obvious that even after this date 
there were times when the king omitted to summon knights and burgesses to 
parliament.
81
 William Prynne and Thomas Hobbes were of essentially the same view.
82
 
Petyt produced a long, unpublished response to Brady in which he purported to show 
that the “the authorities prove by a joint prescription” not only the “several liberties” of 
the lords but also “the ancient right of … sending … knights, citizens and burgesses” to 
be “representatives of the commons”.83 But he was simply advancing more laboriously a 
                                                        
79 See George Hickes, The Harmony of Divinity and Law (London: printed by RE, 1684) at 32-3; also 
John Brydall, The Absurdity of that New Devised State-Principle (London: printed for TD, 1681) at 11 
(“the making of laws is a peculiar and incommunicable privilege of the [king’s] supreme power; and the 
office of the two houses … is only consultive [sic] or preparative”).   
80 “[N]ulli olim ad iudicia & consilia administranda personaliter accersendi erant, nisi qui proximi essent a 
Rege, ipsique arctioris fidei, & homagii vinculo coniuncti, hoc est, immediati vassalli sui, Barones nempe 
cuiuscunq; generis qui de ipso tenuere in Capite, ut partim videas in … Charta libertatum Regis 
Iohannis”. (“[N]one was personally summoned to give judgment and counsel apart from those nearest to 
the king, who were bound to him by the strictest ties of fealty and homage, that is, his immediate vassals, 
barons of whatever kind who held him in chief, as seen in … King John’s charter of liberties”). Henry 
Spelman, Archaeologus (London: Beale, 1626) at 79-80. That Spelman has in mind c 14 of the 1215 
Magna Carta becomes clear ibid at 86. Spelman died in 1641. An expanded version of Archaeologus was 
published under the supervision of William Dugdale as Glossarium Archaiologicum (London: Warren, 
1664); the passage which I quote from the 1626 edition is at 67.  
81 See Robert Brady, A Full and Clear Answer to a Book, Written by William Petit Esq (London: 
Lowndes, 1681) at 225-6; also the more detailed account in Robert Brady, An Introduction to the Old 
English History (London: Lowndes, 1684) at 144-9.  
82 See Prynne, supra note 52 at 226 (“although some of these boroughs … were summoned … most of 
them … had a long discontinuance”), 231 (“[t]he first writs or memorials … extant on record, for electing 
knights, citizens and burgesses to come to our parliaments, are those in … 49 H 3”); T[homas] H[obbes], 
The History of the Civil Wars of England, 2
nd
 ed (London: s.n., 1679 [written 1668]) at 104-05 (“The 
knights of shires and burgesses were never called to parliament, for aught that I know, till the beginning 
of the reign of Edward I, or the latter end of the reign of Henry III, … I do not find [the commons] were 
part of the king’s council at all, … though it cannot be denied … a king may ask their advice”).  
83
 William Petyt, The Antient Right of the Commons of England Reasserted, in Reply to a Book Written 
by Robert Brady, unpublished manuscript (n.d.), Petyt collection, Inner Temple Library, London, MS 
512/L at ff 80, 68v, 80, 74v. (Petyt treated 1189 as the limit of legal memory: ibid at 103-103v.) 
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case which he and others had made already.
84
 A prescribed right is one which has been 
acquired notwithstanding a lack of documentary legal evidence that the right was ever 
created. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that Petyt and other Whig historians 
argued from prescription because they simply had no hard evidence supporting their 
case for a right of the commonality to representation. 
In 1681 there appeared an essay by Petyt’s disciple, William Atwood, which 
made much the same argument, using essentially the same material, as is to be found in 
Petyt’s Antient Right of the Commons of England Asserted. But in the closing pages of 
his essay Atwood distinguished himself by stepping back momentarily from the detail 
and acknowledging that the case for the immemorial sovereignty of parliament could 
never be properly established. While “no sober man will deny” that in the eleventh 
century William I accepted that the lords had “a right of prescription to come to the 
upper house”, it seems “strange”, Atwood thought, that the “royal concession” should 
have been extended to the nobility but not to the laity.
85
 After all, “proprietors of land” 
– holding land either from barons or directly from the king – were naturally “interested 
in” and wanted to “have a share in the legislature”, and so “if they  … had no right to 
come in person, or be represented in parliament,” this would have been “derogatory to 
the prerogative.”86 But would William, a ruler by conquest, really have been so 
concerned to make concessions to his tenants? Atwood had no answer. We could 
“suppose that a king … take[s] it all to himself … [to] make laws by a council of his own 
choosing, or without any [assistance]”, he observed, or we might “suppose … that time 
… establish[ed] this great council”, whereby “the lords [would] come of right in their 
own persons, and … the commons should send representatives of their free choice.”87 
While Atwood knew which supposition he preferred, he could not be sure that his 
preferred supposition was the correct one. Lambarde’s diffidence, it seemed, had 
always been waiting in the wings. 
Atwood’s concession might have amounted to little, but at least it showed him to 
be reflective. The Whig tracts were mantra-like in asserting the commons’ antiquity, 
predictable in their recounting of the history of St Albans, eager to present Lambarde as 
inspirational prophet rather than cautious antiquarian. To what end all this industry 
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 Petyt summarized his case in a short pamphlet: The Pillars of Parliament Struck at by a Cambridge 
Doctor [sc, Brady] (London: Simmons, 1681).  
85 William Atwood, Jus Anglorum ab Antiquo (London: Berry, 1681) at 43.  
86 Ibid.  
87 Ibid at 42. Emphasis in original.  
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nobody cared to point out. What Petyt conspicuously failed to do – what all his like-
minded contemporaries failed to do – was explain why demonstrating parliamentary 
representation to be a prescriptively acquired right should have mattered. Possibly the 
Whig writers considered it to go without saying that long and uninterrupted enjoyment 
is a mark of quality in that which is enjoyed, that evidence of the value of a right might 
therefore be drawn from the fact that it has existed undisturbed (and without falling into 
disuse) for a very long time, and that any king who sought to rule with the assent of the 
people would consider himself bound, or certainly absent good reason would consider 
himself bound, not to restrict or remove any such right. If this way of thinking explained 
the Whigs’ attachment to prescription, they were essentially at one with various eminent 
common lawyers who had lauded immemorial custom as tested reason.
88
 But it is not 
obvious that the Whigs’ case for prescribed representation actually was attributable to 
this way of thinking. The significance of the right to representation having been 
prescriptively acquired – leaving aside the matter of whether it really had been so 
acquired – was taken to be self evident. It is difficult to imagine any of the Whig writers 
rejecting that the proposition that a prescribed right ought not to be disturbed because 
the reasons for accepting that right have stood the test of time. But for none of them 
was this proposition a pillar of their argument for a prescribed right to representation.  
 
C  PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGES 
 
In the seventeenth century, those who connected parliament and prescription were not 
always arguing that parliament itself, or that a right to representation in parliament, had 
existed since time immemorial. Sometimes, they were concerned with what parliament 
was entitled to do. Members of the Jacobean commons turned to prescription to make 
a case regarding their institutional rights. The commons’ “apology” to James I in 1604 
                                                        
88 See e.g. Fortescue, supra note 48 at 26 (“[T]he realm has been continuously regulated by the same 
customs as is now, customs which, if they had not been the best, … kings would have changed …”); 
Thomas Hedley, speech to the commons (28 June 1610) in Proceedings of Parliament 1610. Vol. 2: 
House of Commons, ed E Reed Foster (New Haven: Yale UP, 1966) 170-197 at 175 (“[T]he essential 
form of the common law … is time, … the trier of truth, author of all human wisdom, learning and 
knowledge …”); John Davies, “A Discourse of Law and Lawyers” (1615), in The Works in Verse and 
Prose, Including Hitherto Unpublished Manuscripts, of Sir John Davies, 3 vols, ed AB Grosart 
(Blackburn: Tiplady, 1869-76) II, 243-357 at 252 (“But a custom doth never become a law … until it hath 
been tried and approved time out of mind; during all which time there did thereby arise no 
inconvenience, for if it had been found inconvenient at any time, it had been used no longer, but had 
been interrupted, and consequently it had lost the virtue and force of a law”).  
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for his having been given “misinformation”89 regarding the nature of parliamentary 
privileges was really a complaint that this foreign king was ignorant of the fact that “the 
very fundamental rights of our House”90 were not granted by the crown but rather “our 
right and due inheritance”,91 having been “enjoyed” by “the whole commons … and 
[ou]r ancestors from time immemorable”.92 When the House of Commons reiterated 
this complaint in the “protestation” of 1621 (“the liberties, franchises, privileges and 
jurisdictions of parliament are the ancient and undoubted birthright and inheritance of 
the subjects of England”93), members spoke in parliament of their privileges having been 
acquired by prescription.
94
  
The commons could only have acquired its privileges prescriptively if it had 
existed since time immemorial, and so this argument would have been inconsequential 
to anyone who considered it anachronistic to speak of the commons having existed 
before 1189. But anyone who did believe in an immemorial commons could put the 
argument to good use. Charles II had been wrong to oppose the Exclusion Bill, Daniel 
Defoe claimed in 1689, because the commons’ right to pass laws governing succession 
to the throne was one of its prescriptively acquired privileges.
95
 Writing around the 
same time, Robert Atkyns, once a member the Cavalier parliament and a vigorous 
opponent of the Stuart monarchy, invoked prescription to advance a yet more 
provocative argument. Like others, he presumed the commons to be “as ancient as the 
nation itself”, able “by law” and “title” to “prescribe and claim a share in all 
parliamentary powers and privileges” in conjunction with the lords.96 But he went 
further. If it is accepted as “plain” that “every legal prerogative must be so by 
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 “The Form of Apology and Satisfaction” (20 June 1604) in Select Statutes and other Constitutional 
Documents Illustrative of the Reigns of Elizabeth and James I, 4
th
 ed GW Prothero (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1913) 286-293 at 286.  
90 Ibid at 287. 
91 Ibid at 288. 
92 Ibid at 287.  
93 “Protestation of the House of Commons” (18 Dec 1621) in ibid at 313. 
94 See Proceedings and Debates of the House of Commons, in 1620 and 1621, 2 vols (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1766) II at 332-3 (Christopher Brooke) (“[W]e have our privileges and liberties by 
prescription, time out [of] mind, and not … as granted from kings to us”), 335 (Dudley Digges) (“our 
privileges are our right and inheritance, born with us…. [W]e hold our privileges by custom or 
prescription”), 338 (William Noy).  
95 [Daniel Defoe], The Advantages of the Present Settlement, and the Great Danger of a Relapse 
(London: Chiswell, 1689) at 20 (To presume it to be not “in the power of the parliament to settle the 
succession of the crown … is destructive of all right of conquest or prescription”).  
96
 Atkyns, supra note 75 at 34.  
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prescription”, 97 not only were the commons’ privileges not modern – not granted 
“within time of memory … in a legal understanding” – but, just as significantly, the royal 
power to dispense with laws was modern: the origin of the prerogative was traceable to 
the mid-thirteenth century.
98
 “[D]ispensing with laws”, which is “but of latter times … 
cannot be a prerogative of the king, for that must ever be by prescription”.99 For Atkyns, 
parliament could assert certain rights as prescriptively acquired privileges but, on the 
basis that the dispensing power had not been prescriptively acquired, it could also assert 
a right (one which the king’s bench had pointedly refused to recognize in 1686100) to see 
its legislation enforcing religious conformity prevail against the will of James II.
101
  
 It would be easy, and not entirely wide of the mark, to characterize the 
prescription-based arguments concerning parliament, representation, and privileges as 
illustrative of the well-known thesis that with the seventeenth-century came the doctrine, 
or myth, that the English constitution is, as with all common law, to be understood as 
immemorial custom.
102
 Some of the writers who turned to prescription – Tyrrell, 
Dugdale, Atwood, and Petyt (as well as the outlier, Prynne) – figure prominently among 
the cast regularly cited in support of this thesis. These writers, when they attributed 
parliament’s status or particular parliamentary rights to prescription, were sometimes 
using that word to describe the immemorial (prescriptive) nature of custom; this custom 
of the realm is custom by prescription, they would be saying, by which they meant that 
it was custom since time before memory and therefore a feature of the ancient 
constitution.
103
 
But this is not the only way in which the concept of prescription was being used. 
Seventeenth century constitutional writers were not wholly insensitive to the distinction 
– attributed to Coke in section II(B), above – between custom, which is of the 
community, and prescription, which goes to the person. The idea of the common law 
being founded on immemorial custom, it was recognized, might be distinguished from 
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 Robert Atkyns, An Enquiry into the Power of Dispensing with Penal Statutes (London: Goodwin, 
1689) at 22; see also Atkyns, supra note 75 at 17. 
98 Atkyns, supra note 75 at 23.  
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 Ibid at 50. 
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 Godden v Hales (1686) 11 St Tr 1165. 
101 See Atkyns, supra note 97 at 36-7. 
102 See JGA Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study of English Historical 
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 See also [Samuel Masters], The Case of Allegiance in our Present Circumstances Consider’d 
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usages and practices, as by an immemorial prescription are become the common-law of our 
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the idea that individuals and entities can acquire title to something – as if that thing had 
been expressly granted to them – by virtue of long and uninterrupted enjoyment. 
Constitutional writers never made this distinction explicitly, and sometimes their 
arguments ran against the drawing of it – sending burgesses to parliament, for example, 
was considered equally to be a prescribed customary convention and an entitlement 
granted by ancient kings and acquired by the people through prescription. 
Nevertheless, some of the seventeenth century constitutionalists’ arguments from 
prescription are specifically about the rights of the people or their representatives rather 
than the prescribed customs of the community. This brings us to two further pleas for 
responsible use of the prerogative. 
 
D  MAGNA CARTA 
 
In the seventeenth century, as in other periods, Magna Carta was sometimes described 
as having confirmed ancient liberties rather than having granted any new ones.
104
 The 
first Magna Carta was issued in 1215 – within legal memory. But if it declared existing 
rather than introduced new laws, if the laws which it declared were created before 1189, 
and if the rights protected by those laws were not only declared in Magna Carta but had 
been regularly confirmed since 1215, had the king’s subjects acquired those rights by 
prescription? For Coke, writing around 1611, Magna Carta was certainly to be 
understood a declaration of immemorial, repeatedly reaffirmed legal rights:  
King John … made the two great Charters [Magna Carta and the 1217 Forest Charter], 
which are yet extant to this day…. [T]hose laws and liberties which the nobility of the 
realm did there seek to confirm are partly in the charter of King Henry, and partly 
taken out of the ancient laws of King Edward … and [are] confirmed by the great 
charter made by 9 Hen 3 [the 1225 Magna Carta and its accompanying Forest 
Charter], which for their excellency have been confirmed and commanded to be put in 
execution by the wisdom of thirty several parliaments and above.
105
 
                                                        
104 See e.g. Hedley, supra note 88 at 190 (“I do not take Magna Charta to be a new grant or statute, but a 
restoring or confirming of the ancient laws and liberties of the kingdom, which by the Conquest before 
had been much impeached or obscured”); “Reflections by the Lrd Cheife Justice Hale [d 1676] on Mr 
Hobbes His Dialogue of the Lawe” (n.d.) (1921) 37 LQR 286 at 300 (“[T]he great Charter and the 
Charter of the Forest … were not so much new grants of new liberties but restitutions of those very 
liberties by which the primitive and radical Constitution of the English government were of right 
belonging to them [sc, the king’s subjects]”); Dugdale, supra note 70 at 17.  
105 “To the Reader” (c 1611), in The Eighth Part of the Reports of Sir Edward Coke, Knt, in thirteen 
parts complete, 7 vols, ed G Wilson (Dublin: Moore, 1793) IV at vi-vii (unnumbered pages).  
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 But Coke pointedly did not characterize rights protected by the laws of Edward 
the Confessor and in Henry I’s coronation charter (and confirmed by Magna Carta) as 
rights which had prescribed. Some seventeenth century writers may well have accepted 
such a characterization – perhaps this would have been true of the pamphleteer who, in 
1682, objected to the king using his prerogative to strip the City of London Corporation 
of its privileges (as Charles II did the following year) because they had been granted by 
statute, affirmed by Magna Carta, and prescriptively acquired.
106
 But this is a matter on 
which one can easily end up out on a limb. While it seems “likely” that some 
seventeenth century statesmen were thinking about the content of Magna Carta “in 
terms of prescription”, Corinne Weston has observed, there is no solid evidence that 
anyone actually did.
107
 Those of this period who had an eye for detail might even have 
read the penultimate clause of the 12 October 1297 confirmation (25 Edw I) – “the … 
charter be firmly and inviolably observed in all and each of its articles, even if some of 
the articles contained in the … charter have perhaps not been hitherto observed” – as 
having made prescription irrelevant to the status of charter rights. In 1628, the 
spokesman for the commons, John Glanville, in a speech to both houses before the 
passage of the Petition of Right, came perhaps as close as did any seventeenth century 
figure to reading Magna Carta as a set of prescriptively-acquired rights when he insisted 
that “Magna Carta”, by “declar[ing] and confirm[ing] the ancient common laws of the 
liberties of England”, vested “an inherent right and interest of liberty and freedom in 
the subjects of this realm as their birthright and inheritance, descendable to their heirs 
and posterity”, and that therefore “there is no trust in the king’s sovereign power or 
prerogative royal to enable him to dispense with th[ose laws]”.108 
 If anyone in the seventeenth century was thinking of Magna Carta as a collection 
of prescribed rights, they were probably wise to keep it to themselves. The doctrine of 
prescription demands that the long and uninterrupted enjoyment which is necessary to 
acquisition be strictly construed: if I can show that I and my predecessors in title have 
                                                        
106 Anon, The Rights and Priviledges of the City of London (London: Baldwin, 1682). The argument was 
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Weston, supra note 107 at 379-80.  
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regularly (and without force, stealth, and permission) used a path over my neighbour’s 
land for the relevant prescription period, I acquire by prescription the right to use that 
path – and that right alone. If the laws made by an eleventh century king protected the 
subject’s rights in a particular way, then a claim that those rights had descended to, and 
so had been prescriptively acquired by, citizens in the seventeenth century depended on 
the protection of those laws not only having continued for many centuries but those 
laws having continued without alteration to their content. Anyone intent on making 
Magna Carta the basis for such a claim would have been attempting a very difficult 
manoeuvre.  
 While such a manoeuvre would have been difficult, it was not necessarily 
impossible. Glanville, when he spoke as he did in 1628, presumably had in mind not 
Magna Carta as a whole but rather its clauses setting out general rights and procedures. 
In the early 1600s, some of the more general rights enumerated in Magna Carta – such 
as that freemen were entitled not be arrested and imprisoned without due process of 
law (clause 39) and not to see access to justice sold, denied, or delayed (clause 40) – 
perhaps could have been described as ancient rights affirmed in 1215 and reaffirmed 
regularly ever since. Some early-seventeenth century common lawyers, we saw in 
section II(A), were presuming that rights which could be acquired by prescription had 
existed since 1189, and therefore had prescribed, if they could be shown to have 
persisted without disturbance within actual living memory. Had Glanville or any other 
parliamentarian of this period adopted the same presumption – there is no evidence 
that any of them did – they might have been able to make a convincing case (should 
they have wanted to make the case) for treating particular clauses of Magna Carta as 
expressions of prescribed rights. Without this presumption, however, even a 
prescriptive reading of Magna Carta limited to its more general clauses was a tricky 
proposition, because the rights set forth in those clauses would be incapable of 
prescribing if there was evidence that they could not have prevailed without interruption 
since the coronation of Richard I. 
Certainly it would not have been difficult, in the seventeenth century, to make 
the case that the rights affirmed in some of Magna Carta’s more general clauses could 
not have existed continuously since 1189. Consider, for example, clause 12, which 
stipulates that a monarch cannot levy feudal aid from his subjects “save by the common 
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counsel of our kingdom”. Such a stipulation would not have seemed bizarre in 1189,109 
and the principle that consent is a prerequisite to taxation was certainly reaffirmed by 
parliament at various junctures from the late thirteenth century onwards – including, 
eventually, in both the Petition of Right and the Declaration of Rights.
110
 But 
reaffirmations did not deter various monarchs from imposing taxes without 
parliamentary approval (as Charles I did in the years before the Petition of Right and in 
the decade when he ruled without parliament).
111
 It would have required a considerable 
stretch of the imagination to conclude, in the seventeenth century, that the people had 
within living memory, let alone since 1189, continuously enjoyed the right not to be 
taxed by the king without parliament’s consent. 
 It would have been downright foolish to conclude that, by the seventeenth 
century, Magna Carta in its entirety had prescribed. Much of Magna Carta – clauses 
concerning the removal of alien knights and cross-bowmen from the realm, the 
returning of Welsh hostages, the delaying of decisions on deforestation until the king’s 
return from a crusade, and so on – had fallen into desuetude by 1600. The content of 
the charter, furthermore, had hardly remained unaltered. It was revised within a year of 
its first issue – the 1216 Magna Carta omits three of the original clauses, including the 
provision determining how it was to be enforced (clause 61) – and its text underwent 
numerous other emendations before the definitive version was issued in February 1225. 
As John Selden remarked in 1610, to presume legal constancy as between the eleventh 
and seventeenth centuries was – irrespective of whether Magna Carta was a bridge 
between the present and an immemorial past – straightforwardly to ignore reality: while 
some laws had “been carefully enough kept up from the time of the Saxons, and 
perhaps from an earlier date”, the “times on this side the Norman’s entrance are so full 
of new laws” that “to refer the original of our English laws to th[e] Conquest” can only 
be “a huge mistake”.112 Yet for William Atwood, writing in 1690, constancy was reality: 
“[t]he Confessor’s law … as the noblest transcript of the common law” had been 
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“received by W[illiam] 1 and continued downwards by the coronation oaths required to 
this very day”.113 This was no less anachronistic than claiming that there was a Saxon 
parliament which was much the same institution as the Stuart parliament. Even if 
Magna Carta and the coronation oaths from Edward II (crowned 1307) onwards were 
evidence of the continuity of the Confessor’s laws, there was no reason to think that the 
rights which were eventually enacted in 1689 were essentially the same as those which 
were legally recognized in the eleventh century.
114
  
 Perhaps what is most perplexing about the idea that one might interpret Magna 
Carta prescriptively (as well as the idea that the right to parliamentary representation 
was prescriptively acquired) is the presumption that the king’s subjects could claim a 
right as fundamental because they could show that they enjoyed that right by 
prescription. If a king believed that he ruled by divine sanction, and that he was 
accountable only to God, why should he have cared that a right had existed since the 
time of Edward the Confessor? What was to stop a modern king nullifying rights 
granted by an ancient one? Before concluding with a general assessment of the 
arguments connecting fundamental rights with prescription, let us consider what 
appears to be the one instance in which the seventeenth century literature challenging 
royal absolutism yields a distinct – which is not to say compelling – answer to this 
question. 
 
E  PRESCRIBED RESIDUAL RIGHTS 
 
A few years after the Revolution, George Savile, the Marquess of Halifax, wrote of how 
the sovereignty of parliament made it difficult to speak convincingly of English 
fundamental rights: “no feather has been more blown about in the world than this word 
Fundamental…. There is no fundamental, for the parliament may judge as they please”, 
even if “their act is ill.”115 The difficulty with treating Magna Carta as a collection of 
constitutional fundamentals, he thought, was that it “is very hard to be proved” that it 
“was for the most part declaratory of the principal grounds of the fundamental laws of 
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England” as opposed to simply a grant of liberties by a medieval king.116 If Magna Carta 
was indeed a collection of liberties granted by a king (or, as Halifax preferred, by a 
parliament), then it cannot set forth fundamental rights, for “a subsequent parliament” 
must have “the right of repealing” it just as that “preceding parliament” had “the right of 
making it.”117  
 Halifax appreciated that this reasoning cannot entirely undermine the notion of 
fundamental rights, because just such a right appears to be enjoyed by the sovereign 
legislator. Yet although “the king’s prerogative” is absolute – a “power which neither will 
nor ought to be bounded”118 – the “wise” monarch recognizes “[t]hat prerogative is a 
trust” and that laws “are not the king’s laws, nor the parliament’s laws, but the laws of 
England, in which, after they have passed by the legislative power, the people have the 
property.”119 Robert Atkyns set forth a similar argument in his essay of 1689 attacking 
the use of the dispensing power, though his point seemed to be that enacted laws are 
the property of those who make them – the king, lords, and commons – rather than the 
people.
120
 That this general notion of laws as property was very much in the air in the 
late-seventeenth century is also evident from a letter written from exile in 1687 by the 
Scottish cleric, Gilbert Burnet. It is “a matter of great encouragement”, Burnet 
observed sarcastically, that “the perfect enjoyment of the[ people’s] property has never 
been … invaded by [James II] since his coming to the crown”.121 In the king’s short reign 
there had been many such invasions – the levying of “customs and … additional excise” 
without parliament’s approval, the Bloody Assizes (“an open act of hostility to all law”) 
following the Monmouth Rebellion, the “many murders” and other illegal interferences 
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with “the right that a man has to his life” – and so there was at least reassurance in 
learning that “all these things have fallen out without [the king’s] privity.”122 Although 
Halifax had disparaged fundamental rights, the proposition that the king was not alone 
in being able to claim legislation as his property seemed to lend credence to the 
concept: since the people (or certainly their representatives) had dominion over 
enacted laws along with the king, they had a right to see those laws – their jointly-owned 
property – introduced, respected, amended, and repealed in accordance with their 
wishes.
123
  
 Others besides the king, according to this argument, had property in enacted 
laws. But could one also assert proprietorship over a legal right because it had been 
acquired by prescription rather than expressly granted? Certainly one Whig 
propagandist answered in the negative.
124
 But not everybody considered the idea 
preposterous. A prescriptively acquired easement is not a right conferred but rather a 
right borne of passivity: it comes into being because land has been enjoyed in a 
particular way over a period of time without anyone who was entitled to object to that 
enjoyment having done so. One anonymous pamphleteer, writing at the time of the 
settlement in 1689, remarked on how some fundamental rights might be understood in 
much the same way: not as rights expressly granted, that is, but as rights which have 
been enjoyed for a long time and – until recently – left undisturbed by those with 
legislative power. A fundamental right is typically an “[e]xpress liberty”: “a stipulation … 
by … representatives … or … by princes, when they would either oblige or gratify their 
people, as was the Magna Carta”.125 But a “[t]acit liberty” – the right to act in ways which 
are not contrary to the substantive law and which do not infringe the legal rights of 
others – is no less “property of the subject.”126 A person’s “title” for this property “may 
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be supplied by prescription, … to which perhaps … most … princes must … recur, 
unless they would derive their pedigree from the sons of Noah, and instruct an 
uninterrupted succession ever since.”127  
Quite what this pamphleteer thought prescriptive title to a tacit liberty actually 
conferred on the subject is not clear. That he believed that these liberties limited the 
exercise of the royal prerogative is evident: “the people devolve power on the prince 
upon certain conditions”128 – “these conditions [being] the fundamental laws”129 – and “if 
he does not perform [those conditions] he in effect renounces his right [to rule]”.130 The 
implications of his argument for the law-making sovereignty of parliament, however, are 
less obvious: “resistance” to the sovereignty of “the lawgivers … can never be lawful”, he 
asserted, unless they happen to commit a “notorious violation” of “the fundamental 
laws of the kingdom”.131 What sort of violation would be so notorious as to warrant 
resistance? What form would the resistance take? John Locke, writing around the same 
time, insisted (and was not alone in insisting) that the people had extrajudicial authority 
to seek dissolution of the government if the sovereign legislator abused its powers.
132
 It is 
possible that this pamphleteer was claiming the same, though we cannot be certain that 
he was. This final instance connecting prescription and fundamental rights yields an 
argument every bit as enigmatic as Coke’s famous dictum that the common law would 
control acts of parliament and adjudge them void when they are “against common right 
and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed”.133  
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IV  Analysis 
 
Prescription features barely at all in British constitutional thought after the seventeenth 
century. Edmund Burke touched upon the concept,
134
 as did William Paley,
135
 but by 
the early 1700s constitutional arguments invoking prescription had basically had their 
day. Not that it had been much of a day. In Stuart constitutional discourse, the word 
“prescription” was, we have seen, sometimes used for no purpose other than to 
describe an immemorial custom. Prescription sui generis certainly featured in some 
arguments for restricting royal power, but none of those who relied on the concept 
seemed able, or at least none bothered, to say why the enjoyment and regular re-
affirmation of a right since time before memory should make that right immune to the 
prerogative.  
 Common lawyers have always appreciated that prescription is a fairly inflexible 
doctrine. Enjoyment has to be long and continuous. A definite amount of time has to 
pass before a right can prescribe, and only certain types of rights can prescribe with the 
passing of that time. Restrictive covenants, for example, must be expressly conferred 
and can never be prescriptively acquired. Negative easements are a restricted category, 
not to be extended even by analogy.
136
 While English law allows for the prescriptive 
acquisition of rights to enjoy land, the informal acquisition of legal estates in land is 
governed by the (extinctive) doctrine of adverse possession. Anyone claiming to have 
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acquired a right over land by prescription, one Victorian barrister took considerable 
care to explain, must satisfy a formidable number of conditions.
137
 The seventeenth 
century political writers who appealed to prescription paid little attention to the subtlety 
of the doctrine, and left unresolved various questions concerning its application to 
constitutional matters. Could a doctrine concerning the rights and duties of private land-
holders – concerning how owners of this land but no other land can be said to have 
acquired a right over a neighbour’s land – be straightforwardly re-cast as an argument 
for protecting the rights of a class of people against the intrusions of the state (or 
crown)? If prescription went to individuals and customs to communities, as Coke had 
maintained, how could arguments concerning the general rights of people vis-à-vis the 
crown, and concerning the right of parliament to deal with the succession to the throne, 
genuinely be based on prescription?
 
Before 1689, the argument from prescription was, 
in essence, that the king’s rights should give way to the rights of the subject, as enacted 
(or reaffirmed) by parliament. How, if at all, would that argument apply to parliament 
itself once it had the power to make and change laws? “’Tis most reasonable … now”, 
one convert to the Revolution claimed in 1709, “that … the most rightful government 
which is established” is the one with “the best title … which has prevailed by 
prescription”.138 But what if this government sought to interfere with prescribed liberties 
and privileges? Would it be constrained by the doctrine which had supposedly enabled 
it to prevail? Burke would argue that it was so constrained.
139
 Seventeenth century Whig 
writers appeared to think otherwise.
140
 
 Perhaps the most notable difference between prescription at common law and 
prescription in seventeenth century constitutional thought concerned acquisition. 
Bracton, we have seen, was uncertain as to whether through prescription one acquired a 
possessory right, which could still be defeated by someone with stronger title, or a right 
which was good against all comers. The matter could not be left uncertain at common 
law – litigants wanted to know not only if they had acquired a right but also what kind of 
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right they had acquired. Seventeenth century constitutional writers, unburdened by the 
obligation of ruling on legal disputes, appear never to have given serious thought to the 
question of what sorts of rights prescription might generate. Their general point was that 
prescription makes a constitutional right fundamental in the sense outlined in the 
opening paragraph of this article – that the fact of a right having prescribed should 
make a legislator extremely reluctant to disturb it. The point was distinctively about 
prescribed public law rights – rights which somebody or some entity (usually the 
commons) was seeking to secure against the sovereign. None of these writers was 
arguing that an easement, or any other private law right, was to be categorized as 
fundamental by virtue of prescription. But this was puzzling. Did they believe that 
prescriptively acquired private law rights were fundamental rights? How could 
prescription be the key to understanding the fundamentality of a constitutional right if 
the rights which actually did prescribe in law – various incorporeal rights over land – 
were not considered to be fundamental? Various seventeenth century parliamentarians 
were at once convinced that public law rights might be deemed fundamental by virtue 
of prescription and also silent on the matter of whether the same could be said of 
private law rights. If prescriptively acquired private law rights were not to be classified as 
fundamental rights – it is not obvious that any seventeenth century constitutional writer 
believed that they were to be classified thus – the key to explaining constitutional rights 
as fundamental rights would appear to lie somewhere other than in the doctrine of 
prescription.  
 The doctrine is, in fact, poorly suited to explaining fundamental rights under an 
unwritten constitution. Some of the great seventeenth century English lawyers liked 
compare the common law to the ship long at sea: just as the ship remains the same 
entity even though through repair and refurbishments its material changes over time, 
the common law remains rooted in the same ancient general customs even though it 
adapts to new circumstances and accommodates new content.
141
 Unlike the common 
law, prescription bears no comparison to this ship, for the use or enjoyment cited in 
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support of a claim that a right has been prescriptively acquired must, if the claim is to 
succeed, remain unchanged throughout the prescription period; when there is evidence 
that the use or enjoyment cited to establish the right has not stayed the same or is of 
recent origin, the case for prescriptive acquisition founders. Prescription is ill suited to 
explaining fundamental rights because the content and range of fundamental rights 
need not stay the same – they can be altered and supplemented by legislation and 
through the development of the common law – and such rights will sometimes have 
originated within the prescription period. The right to avoid self-incrimination, for 
example, first appears in English ecclesiastical law in the sixteenth century, does not 
enter the common law until the early seventeenth century,
142
 and only in the twentieth 
century is elaborated so that an arrested person acquires an additional right to be told of 
the right.
143
 The doctrine of prescription cannot satisfactorily explain unwritten-
constitutional rights as fundamental rights, because it requires that all these rights be 
static and very old. 
Nevertheless, some Stuart constitutionalists considered the doctrine to serve 
their objectives with distinction. “An argument from prescription”, Petyt proclaimed, is 
“the most unanswerable and binding argument that possibly can be produced”.144 
Prescription established constitutional title – a word used repeatedly by seventeenth 
century parliamentarians – though it is indisputable that sometimes they meant nothing 
other than that an institution (such as the commons) or a convention (such as sending 
burgesses to parliament) was part of immemorial custom.  
When these writers argued that prescription established constitutional title in 
some more distinctive sense – when prescription was being invoked to explain not the 
community’s prescribed customs but people’s fundamental rights – what reasoning or 
philosophy, if any, lay behind the argument? We can only guess. The reasoning 
sometimes appeared to be that a prescribed right was fundamental because it was first 
in time: a right which has existed since time before memory may well have existed 
before there were kings, and a monarch should not interfere with a right which might 
be presumed to pre-date him and his kind. This seems to be Prynne’s reasoning as 
reported at the outset of section III(A), above, and perhaps also explains that 
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anonymous pamphleteer’s (sardonic?) proposition that the prerogative cannot defeat 
prescriptively acquired title unless the king can justify his exercise of power according to 
an even stronger prescriptive claim – traceable without interruption to the sons of 
Noah.  
We cannot be sure that either Prynne or the pamphleteer was so much as 
implying that prescription established constitutional title according to, and made the 
prerogative challengeable on the basis of, the principle of first in time. And even if 
either had argued this position explicitly, they might have met with a robust response: 
that the principle of first in time does not challenge but rather vindicates the king’s 
prerogative. In a tract published in 1656, thirty years after his death, the poet and lawyer 
Sir John Davies set forth an argument to this effect in the course of defending the king’s 
use of the prerogative to levy impositions without parliamentary consent.
145
 His 
conclusion was predictable enough: that a king rules by divine right. But his route to 
that conclusion is intriguing for our purposes, for he was clearly of the view that the 
prerogative precedes, and so must trump, any prescriptively acquired title. “[T]he law of 
nature”, according to Davies, is “limit[ed]”146 by “ius gentium, or the general law of 
nations … of equal force in all kingdoms”.147 All “kings were made by”148 ius gentium – 
“the first and principal cause of making kings” being to regulate property149 – and by this 
law of nations was their “prerogative given unto them” (“without the consent of the 
people”).150 However, not only did ius gentium not belong to “the ordinary rules of the 
law”151 which “maintain[ed] property and contracts, and traffic and commerce amongst 
men”,152 but it also created kings “before any positive law was made”.153 “Comen ley ad 
este puis le creacion del monde”, one serjeant-at-law proclaimed before the Court of 
Common Pleas in 1470.
154
 For Davies, writing around 150 years later, this had to be 
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wrong, for kings existed before there was a common law. Since the making of kings 
came before the creation of positive law, a monarch was entitled to “retain[] and 
reserv[e] … that absolute and unlimited power which was given unto him by the law of 
nations”.155 The doctrine of acquisitive prescription was but part of the positive law, and 
the positive law, though the king might be “pleased to limit and stint his absolute 
power” by “ty[ing] himself to” its rules,156 could never subordinate the prerogative. 
Prescriptively acquired title is title acquired under rules established by the positive law. 
If the superior title is the one which came first in time, the powers which the law of 
nations vests in the king take priority (if the king wishes them to take priority) over 
rights acquired by prescription. 
Davies preceded both Prynne and the anonymous pamphleteer; his argument 
was not a response to, but rather enables us to envisage a response to, the proposition 
that prescription might serve as a check on the royal prerogative by virtue of the 
principle of first in time. The argument is but an envisaged response because we cannot 
be sure that any seventeenth century constitutional theorist – Prynne or the 
pamphleteer or anybody else – actually endorsed this proposition. Some of these 
theorists evidently believed that particular institutions and practices became 
constitutional fundamentals if it could be said that they had endured undisturbed so as 
to prescribe. But when we try to discover the rationale underpinning that belief, we find 
ourselves on a path upon which darkness quickly descends.  
 As an illustration of this last observation, and by way of conclusion, consider 
John Locke – a name which one might have expected (which I had certainly expected) 
to feature more prominently in this article. In the 1680s, Locke, a hero to the Whigs, 
developed a theory of title acquisition which posed the question to which prescription 
supplies an answer: when did this property “begin to be [the title-holder’s]”, given that 
he acquired it “without the assignation or consent of anybody”?157 Although Locke’s 
own response to the question made no reference to long and uninterrupted enjoyment, 
it is not inconceivable that some of the Whig writers who invoked the notion of 
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entitlement by prescription were thinking broadly as did Locke when he wrote of “how 
labour could … begin a title of property in the common things of nature”158 – that their 
argument was that people (by virtue of long enjoyment rather than labour) have 
property in, and so are entitled not to see disturbed, legal arrangements which protect 
rights that they hold dear. A philosophical denouement would, however, be a 
fabrication. For there is no evidence that any of these writers were thinking along 
Lockean lines (or along any other distinct philosophical lines) when they argued from 
prescription. Tyrrell, who on at least one occasion refers to title by prescription in 
relation to matters constitutional,
159
 was a friend (of sorts) to Locke,
160
 and it would not 
have been surprising to discover in his main works, which appeared after the 
publication of Locke’s Two Treatises of Government, at least references to the labour 
theory of acquisition. Yet neither he nor any other late-seventeenth century Whig 
introduced Locke’s name when invoking prescription – a noteworthy absence, given 
that these men never seemed shy about drawing attention to sources which supported 
their causes.
161
 Prescription was certainly a concept of some significance in seventeenth 
century constitutional thought. Why this should have been so is something of a mystery.  
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